Today's "Washington Post" ran a letter to the editor I sent in regarding the Russian government's crackdown on foreign NGOs. I argue in the letter that "The Kremlin's real goal is probably not to expel foreign human rights groups, a step that would irreparably tarnish Russia's international image, but to intimidate them into self-censorship."

I did not pick the title the Post placed over the letter, which is a little misleading. The Kremlin's crackdown in subtle, not "soft", which is not the same thing (you wouldn't want to buy "subtle toilet paper" or be accused of having a "soft mind", right?).

"Soft crackdown" makes it look like I'm claiming that the Kremlin's move against foreign NGOs is not that serious. Nevertheless, I'm glad the Post allowed me to make the argument that the suspension of some foreign NGOs is part of a very old pattern in Russia. Yesterday evening I read that the government did a quickie job registering NDI and IRI and hinted it would do the same for other groups, which seems to back up my analysis. On the other hand, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and other NGOs are still suspended, so it remains to be seen how accurate my prediction that those NGOs won't be kicked out of the country will prove to be. My goal was to help the Post's readers see through the Kremlin's game of coming down hard initially and then backing off after proving who's boss, thereby establishing an atmosphere of intimidation and self-censorship.

This is especially important because Putin often gets undeserved credit in some circles as a "reformer" when he steps in and moderates the impact of the "hard liners'" considerably less subtle authoritarian tactics.

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